

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 ACDE-00 SOE-02 AF-10

ARA-10 CIAE-00 EA-10 EUR-12 PM-05 H-01 INR-10

IO-13 L-03 NASA-01 NEA-10 NSAE-00 OIC-02 SP-02

PA-01 DOE-11 CEQ-01 OES-07 SS-15 USIA-06 ISO-00

/145 W

-----121692 151757Z /41

R 151659Z MAR 78

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9062

INFO DIA WASHDC

USMISSION GENEVA

USDEL MBFR VIDFNA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 04716

USSALTTWO

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, MBFR, SALT, UR, US

SUBJECT: IUSAC STAFFERS COMMENT ON SALT, MBFR AND RB/ER

SUMMARY: IN 10 MARCH DISCUSSION WITH ARMY ATTACHE AND VISITING AMERICAN ACADEMICS FROM THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE, MEMBERS OF THE IUSAC LED BY MAJ GEN (RET.) M.A. MIL' SHTEYN CONDEMMED ANY ATTEMPTS TO LINK "NONSTRATEGIC", REGIONAL ISSUES WITH SALT, EXPRESSED OPTIMISM ON THE POSSIBILITIES FOR CONCLUDING AN MBFR AGREEMENT, PERHAPS EVEN PRIOR TO THE SIGNING OF A SALT II TREATY, AND DESCRIBED THE ER/RB WEAPON AS "STRATEGIC", THUS LEGITIMATELY LINKED TO SALT, OR ALTERNATIVELY A LOGICAL ISSUE FOR NEGOTIATION AT MBFR. END SUMMARY.

1. ON 10 MAR, ARMY ATTACHE, COL B. LOEFFKE ACCOMPANIED TWO ANALYSTS FROM THE STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE, UCSARMY WAR
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COLLEGE, DRS KEITH A. DUNN AND DANIEL S. PAPP TO A MEETING WITH STAFF MEMBERS FROM THE INSTITUTE OF THE USA AND CANADA (IUSAC). SOVIET PARTICIPANTS INCLUDED V.M. BEREZHKOV, EDITOR OF THE INSTITUTE'S MONTHLY JOURNAL SSRA (USA), DR IVANYAN, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE INSTITUTE, DR GUO TROFIMENKO, HEAD OF THE USFOREIGN POLICY DEPARTMENT, MAJ GEN (RET.) M.A. MIL'SHTEYN, HEAD OF THE

POLITICAL-MILITARY DEPARTMENT, V. KRESTYANOV, SENIOR RESEARCHER AND V. MAZING, A STAFFER IN MIL'SHTEYN'S DEPARTMENT. THE THREE HOUR MEETING FEATURED EXCHANGES ON SEVERAL TOPICS INCLUDING SALT, MBFR, THE HORN OF AFRICA, THE US FOREIGN POLICY PROCESS, AND SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF PRES.

CARTER.

TEW. THE SOVIETS OPENED WITH A SERIES OF QUESTIONS ON THE ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE ARMY'S STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE (SSI) WHERE THEIR VISITORS WORK. GENERAL MIL'SHTEYN WAS THE LEADING INTERLOCUTOR IN THIS REGARD.

HE ASKED WHAT TOPICS THE SSI STUDIES, HOW ITS CONTRIBUTIONS ARE USED BY THE US ARMY AND HOW ITS WORK IS COORDINATED WITH SIMILAR INSTITUTES AFFILIATED WITH THE OTHER SERVICES. THE SOVIETS OPINED THAT SEC DEF BROWN APPEARS INTERESTED IN EXPANDING THE ROLE OF THE US ARMY OVER THE NEXT 5 YEARS.

3. GEN MIL'SHTEYN, WHO CONTINUED TO DOMINATE THE SOVIET SIDE OF THE EXCHANGE WENT ON TO EXPRESS THE FOLLOWING OPINIONS:

-SALT/MBFR: ANY ATTEMPT TO LINK NON-STRATEGIC ISSUES WITH SALT WILL ONLY COMPLICATE THE NEGOTIATIONS AND MAKE REACHING AGREEMENT MORE DIFFICULT. (SEE FURTHER DISCUSSION UNDER "LINKAGES" BELOW) MIL'SHTEYN ALSO CLAIMED THAT AN MBFR AGREEMENT MIGHT BE REACHED BEFORE THE SIGNING OF A CONFIDENTIAL

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NEW SALT TREATY. IF THERE IS A SLOWDOWN IN SALT, WE SHOULD PORCEED TOWARD AGREEMENT AT MBFR. ACHIEVEMENT OF AGREEMENT AT MBFR MIGHT ASSIST IN REACHING AGREEMENT AT SALT. THE GENERAL CHARACTERIZED THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS AS HAVING MORE POLITICAL THAN MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE AND IMPLIED THAT THERE IS CURRENTLY A BALANCE OF EAST-WEST MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

- LINKAGE IN FOREIGN POLICY: MIL'SHTEYN NOTED THAT VARIOUS ASPECTS OF A STATE'S INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR CAN BE LINKED TO ONE ANOTHER BUT ASSERTED THAT SUCH LINKAGES CAN MAKE RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL ISSUES NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE. THEREFORE, IT IS CRUCIAL NOT TO LINK DISSIMILAR ISSUES, IN PARTICULAR TO AVOID LINKING "MIS-BEHAVIOR" BY EITHER THE US OR USSR IN VARIOUS REGIONS OF THE WORLD WITH THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS.

- RB/ER WEAPONS: THE NEUTRON BOMB IS, BY ITS VERY NATURE, LINKED WITH THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS SINCE IT REPRESENTS A NEW TYPE OF NUCLEAR WEAPON. (COMMENT: A SIMILAR LINKAGE WAS MADE A FEW MONTHS AGO IN AN ARTICLE WHICH APPEARED IN THE ST LOUIS POST-DISPATCH AUTHORED BY MIL'SHYEYN'S

IUSAC COLLEAGUE, COL (RET.) L. SEMEYKO, WHO WROTE THAT NEUTRON WEAPONS COULD BE CONSIDERED "STRATEGIC" BECAUSE OF THEIR POSSIBLE EMPLOYMENT ON STRATEGIC CRUISE MISSILES). MIL'SHTEYN ALSO ASSERTED THAT RB/ER WEAPONS WILL LOWER THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD AND THAT THE US IS SEEKING TO USE THEM AS A BARGAINING CHIP IN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. AT A LATER POINT IN THE DISCUSSION, MIL'SHTEYN SAID THAT NEUTRON WEAPONS COULD MORE LOGICALLY BE DISCUSSED IN THE MBFR TALKS THAN AT SALT.

- DETERRENCE AND WAR-FIGHTING: MIL'SHTEYN CLAIMED THAT ALL WEAPONS HAVE INSEPARABLE POTENTIAL FOR BOTH DETERRENCE AND ACTUAL WAR FIGHTING, I.E. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO HAVE ONE WITHOUT THE OTHER. STATES, OF COURSE, CAN AND WILL DIFFER
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IN THEIR PERCEPTIONS WHETHER A PARTICULAR WEAPON IS

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ACTION ACDA-12

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 04716

PRIMARILY INTENDED FOR DETERRENCE OR WAR-FIGHTING

- SOURCES ON US DEFENSE POLICY: THE GEN MENTIONED THAT THE BEST DOCUMENT FOR UNDERSTANDING AMERICAN STRATEGY, TACTICS

AND MILITARY FORCES WAS THE SEC DEF'S ANNUAL POSTURE STATEMENT. HE DESCRIBED THE PB TURE STATEMENTS OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JCS AND SERVICE CHIEFS AS LESS USEFUL BECAUSE THEY ARE MORE PAROCHIAL IN VIEW. HE MENTIONED THAT TESTIMONY BY KEY DOD FIGURES BEFORE CONGRESS WAS ALSO BENEFICIAL, BUT IMPLIED THAT IUSAC RECEIVES FEW OF THESE TESTIMONIES FOR ITS USE. MAZING CLAIMED THAT IUSAC RECEIVED ONLY THREE COPIES OF THE SEC DEF'S DEFENSE POSTURE STATEMENT, WHICH WERE GIVEN TO THE SENIOR MEMBERS OF THE INSTITUTE, THUS DELAYING HIM AND HIS JUNIOR COLLEAGUES THE OPPORTUNITY TO STUDY THIS DOCUMENT.

4. WHEN ASKED HOW THEY FELT ABOUT PRESIDENT CARTER, IVANYAN AND TROFIMENKO RESPONDED THAT IT WAS TOO SOON TO MAKE A CONCLUSIVE JUDGEMENT. MR. CARTER HAS DISAPPOINTED THEM ON SOME ISSUES, AND PLEASED THEM ON OTHERS. HIS FOREIGN POLICY
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IN PARTICULAR WAS DESCRIBED AS INCONSISTENT, WITH ONE SIDE INTENDED TO APPEASE DOMESTIC "PUBLIC OPINION" (A TROFIMENKO QUOTE), AND ANOTHER DESIGNED FOR EXTERNAL CONSUMPTION. AMERICAN ACTIONS IN ANGOLA, THEY SAID, IMPLIED THAT THE US HAD LEARNED SOME LESSONS FROM VIETNAM. THE US POSITION ON THE HORN OF AFRICA, ON THE OTHER HAND, CONFUSES THEM SINCE THE US APPEARS TO BE TILTING TOWARD THE "AGGRESSOR" (SOMILIA), AN PERSISTING IN LINKING SOVIET BEHAVIOR THERE TO SALT.

COMMENT: THIS MEETING WITH IUSAC STAFFERS PROVED LARGELY TO BE A POUNDING BOARD FOR MAJ GEN MIL'SHTEYN. HIS STRONG STAND AGAINST "LINKAGE" IN US-SOVIET RELATIONS, PARTICULARLY BETWEEN SALT AND UNSPECIFIED REGIONAL CONFLICTS, MATCHES THE SOVIET PUBLIC STAND ON THIS POINT. MORE INTERESTING (AND PERPLEXING) IS HIS OPTIMISION REGARDING THE PROSPECTS FOR REACHING AGREEMENT SOON IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, PERHAPS EVEN PRIOR TO CONCLUSION OF A SALT II TREATY. THIS JUDGEMENT APPEARS HARD TO JUSTIFY IN LIGHT OF THE CURRENT IMPOSSE AT VIENNA AND THE GENERAL ABSENCE OF OTHER INDICATIONS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE GIVING HIGH PRIORITY TO THE MBFR TALKS. THIS VIEW MAY REFLECT SOME WISHFUL THINKING ON MIL'SHTEYN'S PART, GIVEN IUSAC'S CORPORATE STAKE IN A HEALTHY US-SOVIET DETENTE RELATIONSHIP. MIL'SHTEYN'S ASSERTION THAT RB/ER WEAPONS ARE "STRATEGIC" IN NATURE AND THUS A LOGICAL ITEM FOR DISCUSSION AT SALT IS ALSO NOTEWORTHY IN VIEW OF RECENT US SPECULATIONS ON THIS SCORE.

5. THIS IS IR NO: 6 901 0244 78. 1. USSR (UR) 2. 6 901 0244 78, 3. TITLE: IUSAC STAFFERS ON SALT, MBFR & RB/ER (U), 4. OMITTED, 5. 780310, 6. 780315, 7. 780310,

MOSCOW USSR, 8. CIR: 2A19000/CONTS, 9. C - 3, 10.

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USDAO MOSCOW USSR (ARMA), 11. YES, 12. BERNARDO LOEFFKE,
COL, USA, ARMA, 13. RICHARD X. LARKIN, BG, USA, DATT,
14. SOVIET OFFICIALS, 15. NON-DIRC. TOON

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: SALT (ARMS CONTROL), MILITARY VISITS, ADVANCED WEAPONS
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Draft Date: 15 mar 1978
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Disposition Action: RELEASED
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